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CHOICE OF LAW: THE ABANDONMENT OF LEX LOCI
DELICTI-SHOULD VIRGINIA FOLLOW THE TREND?
One of the great virtues of the common law is its dynamic nature
that makes it adaptable to the requirements of society at the time of
its application in court. There is not a rule of the common law in force
today that has not evolved from some earlier rule of common law,
gradually in some instances, more suddenly in others, leaving the
common law of today when compared with the common law of centu-
ries ago as different as day is from night. The nature of the common
law requires that each time a rule of law is applied it be carefully
scrutinized to make sure that the conditions and needs of the times
have not so changed as to make further application of it the instru-
ment of injustice. Dean Pound posed the problem admirably in his
Interpretations of Legal History (1922) when he stated, "Law must
be stable, and yet it cannot stand still."'
I. INTRODUCTION
No choice of law rule has enjoyed wider acceptance 2 nor more
mechanical application3 by United States courts than lex loci de-
licti, the rule governing liability for tort by the "law of the place of
the wrong." Written into the First Restatement 4 by the reporter,
Professor Beale, lex loci delicti could be characterized as of 1962, as
the rule followed in the vast majority of the states.5 In the fifteen
years that have intervened since then, that which was once rock has
become fluid, and today it can no longer be said that lex loci delicti
is the majority view in the United States.' This comment will exam-
1. State v. Culver, 23 N.J. 495, 505, 129 A.2d 715, 721 (1957), quoted with approval in
Surratt v. Thompson, 212 Va. 191, 193, 183 S.E.2d 200, 202 (1971).
2. Weintraub, A Method for Solving Conflict Problems-Torts, 48 CORNELL L.Q. 215
(1963).
3. See, e.g., Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Withers, 192 Va. 493, 65 S.E.2d 654 (1951); Sutton
v. Bland, 166 Va. 132, 184 S.E. 231 (1936).
4. RESTATEMENT OF CoNFu r OF LAws §§ 377-97 (1934).
5. See Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 11 (1962).
6. At least half the jurisdictions have rejected lex loci delicti as the invariable rule, prefer-
ing instead modern approaches which require an analysis of the factors involved in the case
to determine what law should be applied to the particular issues of the case. Alaska: Arm-
strong v. Armstrong, 441 P.2d 699 (Alas. 1968); Arizona: Schwartz v. Schwartz, 103 Ariz. 562,
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ine Virginia's choice of law rule, lex loci delicti, and will explore
some of the situations which have led other jurisdictions to abandon
the place of the wrong rule in favor of alternative conflict of law
principles.
447 P.2d 254 (1968); Arkansas: Wallis v. Mrs. Smith's Pie Co., 550 S.W.2d 453 (1977);
California: Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551, 432 P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967); Colorado:
First Nat'l Bank v. Rostek, 182 Colo. 437, 514 P.2d 314 (1973); District of Columbia: Myers
v. Gaither, 232 A.2d 577 (D.C. App. 1967), aff'd, 404 F.2d 216 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Idaho: Rungee
v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 92 Idaho 718, 449 P.2d 378 (1968); Illinois: Ingersoll v. Klein, 46 nl1.
2d 42, 262 N.E.2d 593 (1970); Indiana: Witherspoon v. Salm, 142 Ind. App. 655, 237 N.E.2d
116 (1968); Iowa: Fabricius v. Horgen, 257 Iowa 268, 132 N.W.2d 410 (1965); Kentucky:
Wessling v. Paris, 417 S.W.2d 259 (Ky. 1967); Louisiana: Jagers v. Royal Indem. Co., 276
So.2d 309 (La. 1973); Maine: Beaulieu v. Beaulieu, 265 A.2d 610 (Me. 1970); Massachusetts:
Pevoski v. Pevoski, 358 N.E.2d 416 (1976); Michigan: Sweeny v. Sweeny, 402 Mich. 234, 262
N.W.2d 625 (1978); Minnesota: Schneider v. Nichols, 280 Minn. 139, 158 N.W.2d 254 (1968);
Mississippi: Mitchell v. Craft, 211 So. 2d 509 (Miss. 1968); Missouri: Kennedy v. Dixon, 439
S.W.2d 173 (Mo. 1969); New Hampshire: Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966);
New Jersey: Melk v. Sarahson, 49 N.J. 226, 229 A.2d 625 (1967); New York: Babcock v.
Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963); North Dakota: Issendorf
v. Olson, 194 N.W.2d 750 (N.D. 1972); Ohio: Fox v. Morrison Motor Freight, Inc., 25 Ohio
St. 2d 193, 267 N.E.2d 405 (1971); Oklahoma: Brickner v. Gooden, 525 P.2d 632 (Okla. 1974);
Oregon: Casey v. Manson Constr. & Eng'r Co., 247 Or. 274, 428 P.2d 898 (1967); Pennsyl-
vania: Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964); Rhode Island:
Woodward v. Stewart, 104 R.I. 290, 243 A.2d 917 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 957 (1969);
Washington: Potlatch No. 1 Fed. Credit Union v. Kennedy, 76 Wash. 2d 806, 459 P.2d 32
(1969); Wisconsin: Heath v. Zellmer, 35 Wis.2d 578, 151 N.W.2d 664 (1967). Many other
courts have not had recent occasion to reexamine prior decisions relying on lex loci delicti.
However, the highest courts of some states have retained lex loci even after hearing arguments
based on modem alternatives to the place-of-the-wrong rule. See, e.g., Connecticut: Menczer
v. Menczer, 160 Conn. 563, 280 A.2d 875 (1971);(per curiam); St. Pierre v. St. Pierre, 158
Conn. 620, 262 A.2d 185 (1969)(per curiam); Landers v. Landers, 153 Conn. 303, 216 A.2d
183 (1966); Delaware: Folk v. York-Shipley, Inc., 239 A.2d 236 (Del. 1968); Florida: Hopkins
v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 201 So. 2d 743 (Fla. 1967), rev'd on rehearing 201 So. 2d 749 (Fla.
1967); Kansas: McDaniel v. Sinn, 194 Kan. 625, 400 P.2d 1018 (1965); Maryland: White v.
King, 244 Md. 348, 223 A.2d 763 (1966); North Carolina: Shaw v. Lee, 258 N.C. 609, 129
S.E.2d 288 (1963); Petrea v. Ryder Tank Lines, Inc., 264 N.C. 230, 141 S.E.2d 278 (1965);
Henry v. Henry, 291 N.C. 156, 229 S.E.2d 158 (1976); South Carolina: Oshiek v. Oshiek, 244
S.C. 249, 136 S.E.2d 303 (1964); Algie v. Algie, 261 S.C. 103, 198 S.E.2d 529 (1973); South
Dakota: Heideman v. Rohl, 86 S.D. 250, 194 N.W.2d 164 (1972); Tennessee: Winters v.
Maxey, 481 S.W.2d 755 (Tenn. 1972); Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Hartford Acc. and Indem. Co.,
519 S.W.2d 579 (Tenn. 1975); Texas: Marmon v. Mustang Aviation, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 58 (Tex.
1967), aff'd 430 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. 1968); Click v. Thuron Indus., Inc., 475 S.W.2d 715 (Tex.
1972).
Even in these remaining hold-out states, the use of lex loci delicti as an invariable rule is
an uneasy proposition. In Connecticut, the legislature has ruled out resort to lex loci where a
Connecticut domiciled spouse sues his spouse for injury resulting from negligent operation of
a motor vehicle in a foreign jurisdiction. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572d (West Supp. 1978).
In dicta, the Supreme Court of Kansas has suggested that it will be receptive to further
argument as to which conflicts approach should prevail in that state. Brown v. Wichita State
Univ., 219 Kan. 2, 547 P.2d 1015, 1031 (1976).
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II. LEx Loci DELICTI
Lex loci delicti is rooted in the vested rights doctrine espoused
primarily by Professor Beale. 7 It is a concept of territorial law, in
that: "a right to recover for a foreign tort owes its creation to the
law of the jurisdiction where the injury occurred and depends for its
existence and extent solely on such law."8 It is upon this single
factor-the place where the injury occurred ' -that lex loci deter-
mines choice of law; all matters of substantive law must necessarily
be decided according to the law obtaining in that single jurisdiction.
Where the point at issue is "was a tort committed?," lex loci
delicti is a logical and rational rule. Where this is the concern, the
law of the place of injury would control even under modern choice
of law rules."0 But with issues at the periphery of tort law," lex loci
delicti shows its over-breadth and it is here that the place of the
wrong rule has often produced irrational and unjust results.
The case of Victor v. Sperry"2 provides an example of the harsh
results which lex loci can produce. Victor concerned an action for
injuries sustained by an automobile passenger against his driver and
another as a result of a collision which occurred in Mexico. The
parties in the action were all California residents and, presumably,
it was there that their automobiles were licensed, registered and
insured. The plaintiff's injury resulted in permanent paralysis of his
left arm and permanent partial paralysis of his left leg. 3 The trial
7. See R. LEFLAR, AMEucIAN CONFLICTS LAw, 205 (rev. ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as
LEFLAR]; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNFLICT OF LAws, Introductory Note for §§ 145-185 at
412 (1971). See also, Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 478, 191 N.E.2d 279, 281, 240 N.Y.2d
743, 746 (1963).
8. Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 478, 191 N.E.2d 279, 281, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 746
(1963).
9. For a discussion of occasional problems in ascertaining the place where the injury oc-
curred see LEFLmA, supra note 7 at 333-344.
10. Where the defendant's exercise of due care in the operation of his automobile is
in issue, the jurisdiction in which the allegedly wrongful conduct occurred will usually
have a predominant, if not exclusive, concern. In such a case, it is appropriate to look
to the law of the place of the tort so as to give effect to that jurisdiction's interest in
regulating conduct within its borders, and it would be almost unthinkable to seek the
applicable rule in the law of some other place.
Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 484, 191 N.E.2d 279, 284, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 751 (1963).
11. E.g., capacity to sue, immunity from suit and limitations on recovery for wrongful
death.
12. 163 Cal. App.2d 518, 329 P.2d 728 (1958).
13. Until the time of the accident plaintiff had been employed as a house mover at a weekly
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court found that plaintiff suffered $40,462.05 in actual damages but
applying lex loci delicti, turned to Mexican law for the measure of
damages. The appellate court noted that Mexican law permitted
the plaintiff to recover hospital and medical expenses, but that
For a temporary total disability he could recover only 75 percent of
his lost wages for a period not to exceed one year. Wages in excess of
25 pesos, or $2 per day, could not be taken into account in computing
the amount allowed. If he suffered a permanent and total disability,
he could recover lost earnings for only 918 days and, even though he
earned more than 25 pesos per day, only that amount could be taken
into account in computing the amount of the recovery."
The appellate court then upheld the trial court's award of $6,135.96.
Kaufman v. American Youth Hostels, Inc.,'-' provides another il-
lustration of the disturbing results that can occur under lex loci
delicti. In Kaufman, the defendant was an eleemosynary institution
engaged in conducting groups of youths on tours. The defendant
corporation was incorporated in New York and presumably was
insured against liability there, since New York does not grant chari-
table immunity.
Plaintiffs 15-year-old daughter was one of a group of children
which the defendant institution led on a climb of Mount Hood in
Oregon. The children fell down the mountain and plaintiff's daugh-
ter died as a result of the injuries caused by the fall. Although the
plaintiff and his decedent were New York residents suing a New
York corporation, the court (applying lex loci delicti) ruled that
Oregon law, under which a charitable institution was1' then exempt
from liability for its acts of negligence, was controlling and held for
the defendant.
Dissatisfied with an inflexible rule making the often completely
fortuitous place of the wrong the only point of consideration for
wage of $99. It was determined that he would not be able to engage in that occupation or in
any occupation requiring substantial physical activity.
14. Victor v. Sperry, 163 Cal. App.2d 518, 520, 329 P.2d 728, 730 (1958)(emphasis added).
15. 6 App. Div. 2d 223, 177 N.Y.S.2d 587 (1958), modified in other respects, 5 N.Y.2d 1016,
158 N.E.2d 128, 185 N.Y.S.2d 268 (1959).
16. Oregon no longer grants charitable immunity from liability for negligence. See Hunger-
ford v. Portland Sanitarium & Benevolent Assn., 235 Or. 412, 384 P.2d 1009 (1963).
[Vol. 13:133
ABANDONMENT OF LEX LOCI DELICTI
choice of law; recognizing the significant interests that the domicile
of the parties has; and, unwilling to allow harsh results for no better
reason than ease of administration, the great majority of courts
having an opportunity to examine their conflict of law rules for tort
have rejected lex loci delicti.1 7
III. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES
The unprecedented unanimity reached by scholars in their oppo-
sition to lex loci delicti 8 would seem to indicate fertile ground for
consensus on a replacement, but a single alternative to lex loci has
not yet emerged. To be sure, alternate approaches share the com-
mon premise that the preferred objective in choice of law is to decide
a case according to the law of the state having the greatest interest
in its resolution. It is in the methodology to be used in determining
which state has the controlling interest that disagreement arises. 9
17. See cases cited in note 6 supra.
18. See, e.g., REsTATEmENT (SECOND) OF CoNFIucrs OF LAWS § 145 (1971); Cavers, A Critique
of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARV. L. Rav. 173 (1933); Cheatham, American Theories
of Conflict of Laws: Their Role and Utility, 58 HARv. L. REV. 361 (1945); Cook, Tort Liability
and the Conflicts of Laws, 35 COLUM. L. REv. 202 (1935); Currie, Comments on Babcock v.
Jackson, A Recent Developmbnt in Conflict of Laws, 63 COLUm. L. REv. 1233 (1963); Ehren-
zweig, The "Most Significant Relationship" in the Conflicts Law of Torts, 28 LAW & CoNTEMP.
PROB. 700 (1963); Harper, Policy Bases of the Conflict of Laws: Reflections on Rereading
Professor Lorenzen's Essays, 56 YALE L.J. 1155 (1947); Lorenzen, Territoriality, Public Policy
and the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE L.J. 736 (1924); Morris, The Proper Law of a Tort, 64 HARV.
L. REV. 881 (1951); Reese, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development in
Conflict of Laws, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 1251 (1963); Rheinstein, The Place of Wrong: A Study
in the Method of Case Law, 19 TUL. L. REV. 4, 165 (1944); Stumberg, "The Place of the
Wrong": Torts and the Conflict of Laws, 34 WAsH. L. REv. 388 (1959); Traynor, Is This
Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 TEXAS L. Rav. 657 (1959); Yntema, The Hornbook Method and
the Conflict of Laws, 37 YALE L.J. 468 (1928).
19. More heat than light is generated in the disagreement:
Against every rule applied and every proposal made great clouds of criticism have been
raised, and each commentator appears to have a different "best" solution for the
difficulty. The applicable rules for a conflicts law of torts have constantly changed in
the ceaseless search for a just and fair resolution of the problem.
Lowe's North Wilkesboro Hdwre., Inc. v. Fidelity Mut. Ins. Co., 319 F.2d 469, 473 (4th Cir.
1963)(footnotes omitted). Ehrenzweig criticizes the case for its reliance on the significant
contacts approach of the Second Restatement. See Ehrenzweig, The "Most Significant Rela-
tionship" In the Conflicts Law of Torts, 28 LAW & CoNTrEM. PROB. 700 (1963). The several
modem methodologies reflect common elements and overlap each other, so that courts will
often combine individual approaches for a method which utilizes the language of a theory
with a disregard of its theoretical basis. See, e.g., Fox v. Morrison Motor Freight, Inc., 25
Ohio St.2d 193, 267 N.E.2d 405 (1971); Fuerste v. Bemis, 156 N.W.2d 831 (Iowa 1968); Jagers
v. Royal Indem. Co., 276 So.2d 309 (La. 1973). This is not to criticize the courts employing
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Limitations of space make it impossible to even briefly cover all
the major theories2 suggested in replacement of lex loci delecti. It
is believed that three-the Choice-Influencing Considerations ap-
proach, the Second Restatement's Most Significant Relationship
formula and the Governmental Interest Analysis-not only com-
mand the widest following in the courts but also cover the broad
spectrum in tort choice of laws.
A. Choice-Influencing Considerations
Under the choice-influencing approach2' the relevant factors in
determining the choice of law applicable to individual issues are the
following five, listed without regard to priority:22
(A) Predictability of Results;
(B) Maintenance of interstate and international order;
(C) Simplification of the judicial task;
the modern methods, for they generally reach excellent results; it is rather a recognition of
the fact that in applying approaches, as opposed to rules, the courts must give flesh to
guidelines while knowing that the next case may not fit within those lines. One writer finds
the difficulty faced by the courts in working with the approaches to yield a decision akin to
that of Lewis Carroll's Alice: "It sounded an excellent plan, no doubt, and very neatly and
simply arranged; the only difficulty was, that she had not the smallest idea how to set about
it." Shapira, "Grasp All, Lose All": On Restraint and Moderation in the Reformation of
Choice of Law Policy, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 248, 251 (1977), citing L. CARROLL, ALICE'S ADVEN-
TURES IN WONDERLAND 61.
20. Compare the various methodologies and approaches suggested by the following:
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 (1971); A. EHRENZwEiG, CONFLICT OF LAWS
(1962); LEFLAR, supra, note 7; G. STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS (3d ed. 1963); Cavers,
Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development in Conflict of Laws, 63 COLUM. L.
REV. 1219 (1963); Cheatham & Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law, 52 COLUM. L. REv. 959
(1952); Currie, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development in Conflict of Laws,
63 COLUM. L. REv. 1233 (1963); Harper, Policy Bases of the Conflict of Laws: Reflections on
Rereading Professor Lorenzen's Essays, 56 YALE L.J. 1155 (1947); Reese, Conflict of Laws and
the Restatement Second, 28 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROB. 679 (1963); Traynor, Is This Conflict
Really Necessary?, 37 TEXAS L. REV. 657 (1959); Weintraub, A Method for Solving Conflict
Problems-Torts, 48 CORNELL L.Q. 215 (1963); Comment, The Second Conflicts Restatement
of Torts: A Caveat, 51 CALIF. L. REv. 762 (1963).
21. The theory is associated primarily with Professor Robert Leflar. Professor Leflar is
quick to point out that he did not pioneer the concept of policy valuations as a decisional
basis in choice of law. Among the first to analyze such factors were Profemors Cheatham and
Reese who listed nine. See Cheatham & Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law, 52 COLUM. L.
REV. 959 (1952). Covering essentially the same matters are seventeen "policy considerations"
identified by Professor Yntema. See Yntema, The Objectives of Private International Law,
35 CAN. BAR REv. 721 (1957). It is Leflar who has distilled the varying considerations to five.
22. LEFLAR, supra note 6, at 245.
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(D) Advancement of the Forum's governmental interests; and
(E) Application of the better rule of law.?
The courts of several jurisdictions have utilized the choice-
influencing considerations theory as a basis for decision24 and have
found in it a combination of "workable brevity" and "reasoned
analysis."' Because it is the least structured of the modern ap-
proaches, choice influencing considerations is also the most flexi-
ble.26 But this flexibility, and in particular the concept of a "better
rule of law," make it the most subjective and result-selective of the
suggested methods. It has been suggested that the better rule of law
idea candidly reflects what has been judicial practice all along and
that by utilizing the framework of choice of laws a judge can clear
a path for domestic reform.27 However, we would do well to question
whether conflicts cases ought to be purposely treated as "a play-
ground for timid judicial reformers. 128
23. Id.
24. See Milkovich v. Saari, 295 Minn. 155, 203 N.W.2d 408 (1973); Schneider v. Nichols,
280 Minn. 139, 158 N.W.2d 254 (1968); Mitchell v. Craft, 211 So. 2d 509 (Miss. 1968); Clark
v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966); Brown v. Church of the Holy Name of Jesus,
105 R.I. 322, 252 A.2d 176 (1969); Woodward v. Stewart, 104 R.I. 290, 243 A.2d 917, cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 957 (1968); Zelinger v. State Sand and Gravel Co., 38 Wis. 2d 98, 156 N.W.2d
466 (1968).
25. Woodward v. Stewart, 104 R.I. 290, 243 A.2d 917, 923, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 957 (1968).
26. Mitchell v. Craft, 211 So. 2d 509 (Miss. 1968) is illustrative of the approach. The issue
was whether Mississippi's comparative negligence rule, or Louisiana's contributory negli-
gence rule, should apply to a wrongful death suit in which the parties, litigants and decedents,
were domiciled in Mississippi and Louisiana's sole contact was that the accident occurred
there. The Mississippi court found that predictability was irrelevant under these facts since
accidents are not planned and predictability is not a factor with reference to liability. Also,
maintenance of interstate order was irrelevant since neither state would be affected however
the court decided. As to simplicity, Mississippi found its comparative negligence rule simple
and easy to apply. Mississippi found that its interests would be significantly advanced by
application of Mississippi law and lastly, the court found its rule the "better" rule. Id. at 514.
27. Ehrenzweig, "False Conflicts" and the "Better Rule": Threat and Promise in Multi-
state Tort Law, 53 VA. L. RV. 847, 855 (1967).
28. B. CumE, The Verdict of the Quiescent Years, in SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT
OF LAWS 144 (1963). See also Couch, Louisiana Adopts Interest Analysis: Applause and Some
Observations, 49 TuLANE L. Rav. 1 (1974).
[Tihe notion that a court, in a conflicts case, should choose that which it deems the
better rule strikes me as a wholly inappropriate judicial function and foreign to a
rational body of choice-of-law rules. That kind of license is tantamount to no rule. Id.
at 18.
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B. Second Restatement
The Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws29 takes the position
that in deciding a particular issue in tort, a court should decide the
rights and liabilities of the parties according to the local law of the
state which has the most significant relationship to the occurrence
and the parties with respect to that issue.30 That determination is
to be made with reference to contacts31 which include the place
where the injury occurred,3 2 the place where the conduct causing the
injury occurred,3 3 the domicile, residence, nationality, place of in-
corporation and place of business of the parties,u and the place
where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.35
Evaluation of these contacts should be made in light of their import-
ance with respect to the particular issue and with reference to cer-
tain principles3" which are generally relevant in any conflicts of law
process.
The Second Restatement's view has generally not met with the
applause of scholars. They attack its subjectivity and fear that it
will degenerate into mere contact counting. It has, however, been
29. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNFTar OF LAWS § 145 (1971).
30. Id. § 145(1).
31. Id. § 145(2).
32. Id. § 145(2)(a).
33. Id. § 145(2)(b).
34. Id. § 145(2)(c).
35. Id. § 145(2)(d).
36. In the absence of a statutory directive of its own state on choice of law-which a court,
subject to constitutional restriction, will tollow-a court should consider the needs of the
interstate and international systems; the relevant policies of the forum, and those of other
interested states; the relative interest which other states have in the determination of a
particular issue; the protection of justified expectations; the basic policies underlying the
particular field of law; certainty, predictability, and uniformity of result; as well as ease in
determination and application of the law to be applied. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT
OF LAWS § 6 (1971).
37. See Currie, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development in Conflict in
Laws, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 1233 (1963); Ehrenzweig, The Second Conflicts Restatement: A Last
Appeal for its Withdrawal, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 1230 (1965). Any interest analyzing method is
by definition subjective. The Second Restatement approach, which features a highly struc-
tured analysis, is among the least subjective.
38. See Currie, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development in Conflict of
Laws, 63 COLUM. L. Rav. 1233 (1963); Leflar, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent
Development in Conflict of Laws, 63 CoLum. L. REv. 1247 (1963); Weintraub, A Method for
Solving Conflict Problems-Torts, 48 ComELL L.Q. 215 (1963). As was noted earlier, this is
a difference over methodology only; the commentators are united in their criticism of lex loci
delicti.
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employed, to a greater or lesser extent by a number of courts39 who
see in it elements of all the major theories. 0
C. Governmental Interest Analysis
The "governmental interest" approach' to choice of law is keyed
on the policy bases underlying the domestic laws in putative con-
flict.4" The hallmark of the governmental interest approach is the
39. Typical of cases using the Second Restatement approach is Kennedy v. Dixon, 439
S.W.2d 173 (Mo. 1969): in a suit by an injured passenger against the estate of the deceased
driver, both residents of Missouri, for personal injuries arising out of an automobile collision
in Indiana, Indiana's guest statute was raised by the defense. Missouri does not have a guest
statute. The Missouri Supreme Court found that the parties were Missouri residents, had
made their trip arrangements in Missouri, and traveled in a car licensed and garaged in
Missouri. The court reasoned that while Indiana had a real interest in requiring Missouri
residents to comply with its standards of care for operation of motor vehicles on Indiana
highways, that interest did not extend to the relationship between two Missouri citizens.
Missouri did have such an interest and Missouri law would govern. Id. at 184-185.
40. Compare, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONFUCT OF LAws § 6(2)(1971) with Leflar's
choice-influencing considerations, LEFLAI, supra note 7.
41. The late Professor Brainerd Currie was the leading proponent of governmental interest
analysis. Currie's suggested approach was set out in Currie, Comments on Babcock v. Jack-
son, A Recent Development in Conflict of Laws, 63 COLum. L. REv. 1233, 1242-43 (1963):
When a court is asked to apply the law of a foreign state different from the law of
the forum, it should inquire into the policies expressed in the respective laws, and into
the circumstances in which it is reasonable for the respective states to assert an interest
in the application of those policies. In making these determinations the court should
employ the ordinary processes of construction and interpretation.
. . . If the court finds that one state has an interest in the application of its policy in
the circumstances of the case and the other has none, it should apply the law of the
only interested state.
. . . If the court finds an apparent conflict between the interests of the two states it
should reconsider. A more moderate and restrained interpretation of the policy or
interest of one state or the other may avoid conflict.
If, upon reconsideration, the court finds that a conflict between the legitimate
interests of the two states is unavoidable, it should apply the law of the forum.
. . . If the forum is disinterested, but an unavoidable conflict exists between the laws
of the two other states, and the court cannot with justice decline to adjudicate the case,
it should apply the law of the forum-until someone comes along with a better idea.
. . . The conflict of interest between states will result in different dispositions of the
same problem, depending on where the action is brought. If with respect to a particular
problem this appears seriously to infringe a strong national interest in uniformity of
decision, the court should not attempt to improvise a solution sacrificing the legitimate
interest of its own state, but should leave to Congress, exercising its powers under the
full faith and credit clause, the determination of which interest shall be required to
yield.
42. R. WEnmrRAuB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws 4 (1971).
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concept of a "false conflict."43 A false conflict is presented when,
after analysis of the content and objectives of competing laws, it is
found that only one state has a real interest in the application of
its law. It is the law of that state44 which is then applied. Since the
vast majority of conflicts cases present situations wherein only one
state has a real interest, and because it is with false conflicts that
lex loci has produced its least defensible results, the governmental
interest methodology has considerable appeal in the typical con-
flicts case.
Under interest analysis, the Victor0 5 case shows what is clearly a
false conflict. The only point at issue is whether Mexico's limitation
on damages is to apply. California, which does not limit damages,
clearly has an interest in properly compensating the injured party
so he will not become a ward of the state" and so that there is an
adequate pool from which local medical and other creditors, having
furnished services to the victim as a result of his injury, may be
compensated. Mexico, on the other hand, has no interest in apply-
ing its limitation on damages-there are no defendant Mexican resi-
dents to protect from the imposition of excessive financial burdens
and Mexico can have no interest in denying full recovery to a non-
resident injured by non-Mexican defendants." California law, then,
would be applied.4 8
43. Professor Weintraub favors the term "spurious conflict" over "false conflict." R. WEIN-
TRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 201 (1971). Neither term has achieved exclusive
dominance, and "spurious" and "false" can be used rather interchangeably.
44. But see Ehrenzweig, "False Conflicts" and the "Better Rule": Threat and Promise in
Multistate Tort Law, 53 VA. L. REv. 847 (1967).
45. See note 12 supra.
46. Cf. Hurtado v. Superior Ct. of Sacramento County, 11 Cal. 3d 574, 522 P.2d 666, 114
Cal. Rptr. 106 (1974)(Mexican limitation on damages for wrongful death not applied in suit
by a Mexican plaintiff against a California resident defendant).
47. Id.
48. Kaufman v. American Youth Hostels, supra, note 15, is similarly shown to present a
spurious conflict. Both New York and Oregon have policies of indemnity and protection for
the victim of tortious conduct. Oregon's policy was overridden by a policy of fostering and
conserving the funds of charitable institutions. See note 16 supra. But under the facts of this
case, all the parties are domiciled in New York; Oregon has no interest in shielding the assets
of a New York corporation where New York would not, absent the fact of beneficial activities
by the institution in Oregon, a factor not presented here. Accord, Blum v, Am. Youth Hostels,
Inc., 40 Misc. 2d 1056, 244 N.Y.S.2d 351 (S. Ct., Special Term, 1963), aff'd on other grounds,
21 App. Div. 2d 683, 250 N.Y.S.2d 522 (1964). See Brown v. Church of Holy Name of Jesus,
105 R.I. 322, 252 A.2d 176 (1969). See also B. CURRIE, Unconstitutional Discrimination in the
Conflict of Laws: Equal Protection, in SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws, 526, 557-
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More troublesome is the problem where the policies of competing
states conflict even after a court has made a "moderate and re-
strained interpretation" of those policies. Under the governmental
interest approach, where a court finds a conflict unavoidable it
should apply the forum's law regardless of any other state's interest:
the forum yields only where it is disinterested and there is a foreign
interest.49
In this, the governmental interest approach asks too much. In the
area of false conflicts, governmental interest analysis proves itself
eminently workable and logical. To concede defeat when the conflict
is true and to apply mechanically the law of the forum would serve
no rational end, would encourage forum shopping," and in some
cases, would prove unfair to the defendant. 51
What, then, is a practical and workable alternative to the invaria-
ble application of lex loci delicti?
IV. THE SUGGESTED APPROACH: INTEREST Up To A POINT
Conflict of laws in tort has been dominated in recent years by two
types of cases: those involving the doctrine of interspousal immun-
ity and those which concern automobile guest statutes. Examina-
tion of hypotheticals from these two areas, it is hoped, will both
reveal that change in Virginia's choice of law rules is desirable and
suggest the methodology best designed to replace the traditional
view.
A Virginia conflicts case involving an inter-spousal immunity
problem might develop along these lines: a married couple, both
Virginia domiciliaries, travel to West Virginia for an evening out.
568 (1963); R. WEiNTRAUB, COMMENrARY ON THE CoNuLicr or LAws 220-221 (1971).
Application of New York law advances the interests of New York without defeating any
interest of Oregon. Under governmental interest analysis the law of New York, the only
interested state, would be applied. B. CuRm, Unconstitutional Discrimination in the Con-
flict of Laws: Equal Protection, in SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLIcT OF LAwS 526, 557-559
(1963).
49. M. Traynor, Conflict of Laws: Professor Currie's Restrained and Enlightened Forum,
49 CALIF. L. REV. 845, 847 (1961).
50. Cf. Currie, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development in Conflict of
Laws, 63 COLUM. L. Rav. 1233, 1243 (1963) (Professor Currie states: "The conflict of interest
between states will result in different dispositions of the same problem, depending on where
the action is brought...").
51. See page 147, infra.
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While still in West Virginia, a state which adheres to the immunity
doctrine, 52 the wife is injured in an accident caused by the husband's
negligence. The wife brings suit against the husband in Virginia,
which has abolished the inter-spousal immunity doctrine in actions
for personal injuries resulting from motor vehicle accidents. 53
The only issue raised is whether the wife has capacity to sue the
husband in tort. Virginia clearly has a real interest in permitting the
suit. Compensation to the wife will ease her and the family's finan-
cial burden and prevent her from becoming a public charge. 4 More-
over, with the high incidence of insurance, denial of recovery will
likely be disruptive of marital harmony and will run counter to
expectations.55 What interest might West Virginia advance for Vir-
ginia's not permitting this suit by Virginia domiciliaries in a Vir-
ginia court? The rationale for West Virginia's retention of inter-
spousal immunity is preservation of harmony in the marital rela-
tion. We need not ponder whether adherence to the doctrine still
52. Campbell v. Campbell, 145 W. Va. 245, 114 S.E.2d 406 (1960); Poling v. Poling, 116
W. Va. 187, 179 S.E. 604 (1935).
53. Surratt v. Thompson, 212 Va. 191, 183 S.E.2d 200 (1971).
54. Weintraub, A Method for Solving Conflict Problems-Torts, 48 CoRNELL L.Q. 215, 217
(1963).
55. [R]ealistically, it must be remembered when dealing with the question of con-
jugal harmony that today virtually every owner of a motor vehicle with a sense of
responsibility carries liability insurance coverage. The presence of insurance militates
against the possibility that the interspousal relationship will be disrupted since a
recovery will in most cases be paid by the insurance carrier rather than by the defen-
dant spouse. In fact, it is ironic that the presence of insurance has spawned the second
rationale, i.e., that of protecting the insurance carriers against fraud and collusion.
That rationale belies the possibility that domestic harmony will be disturbed since its
very premise is that the interspousal relationship is so harmonious that fraud and
collusion will result. Domestic harmony may be more threatened by denying a cause
of action than by permitting one where there is insurance coverage. The cost of making
the injured spouse whole would necessarily come out of the family coffers, yet a tortfea-
sor spouse surely anticipates that he will be covered in the event that his negligence
causes his spouse injuries. This unexpected drain on the family's financial resources
could likely lead to an interference with the normal family life. And it is doubtful that
this void in insurance coverage would comport with the reasonable expectations of the
insured that this Court has so often sought to protect. . . . In short, the immunity
doctrine cannot be fairly sustained on the basis that negligence suitu between husbands
and wives will disrupt the harmony of the family. Immer v. Risko, 56 N.J. 482, 489-
90, 267 A.2d 481, 484-85 (1970)(footnote omitted), quoted with approval in Smith v.
Kaufman, 212 Va. 181, 185-186, 183 S.E.2d 190, 194 (1971)(abrogating parental im-
munity in automobile accident litigation).
See Surratt v. Thompson, 212 Va. 191, 183 S.E.2d 200 (1971).
56. Authority cited note 52 supra.
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serves that goal, for while West Virginia's policy would be signifi-
cant were our parties West Virginians, that state has no interest in
shielding Virginia marriages from the strain of litigation where Vir-
ginia would not. Faced with this situation a Virginia court should
apply the law of the only interested state-Virginia.
In the obverse situation-a married couple from West Virginia
having an accident in Virginia, with injuries to the wife again result-
ing from the husband's negligence-interest analysis yields the op-
posite result. It does not matter that Virginia finds the West Vir-
ginia policy ill-advised and anachronistic, since West Virginia is the
best judge of how marital harmony can be maintained in that state.
Indeed, Virginia's interests will be advanced by the application of
West Virginia law, since the forum, qua forum, has an interest in
preventing forum shopping.
The two situations above indicate the strong significance of domi-
cile in an interest analysis approach. This is as it should be, for
when the issue is not "has a tort been committed?" but capacity to
sue, immunity from suit, or the possibility or limitation of recovery
for wrongful death, 7 the domicile of the parties will generally have
a real, if not the only, interest.
Interest analysis is not lex loci domicilii in mufti, however, as a
variation on the facts in the second hypothetical will demonstrate.
Again assume we have West Virginia spouses involved in a Virginia
accident, but this time the husband is joined in his negligence by a
Virginian in another car. The wife now makes the Virginian the
defendant in her suit. The defendant, by a third-party motion for
judgment,"8 seeks contribution from the plaintiff's husband and,
more importantly, from his insurer. At the nub of the problem is
inter-spousal immunity: if West Virginia law is applied there will
be no underlying liability in the husband on which a claim for
contribution from the husband's insurer can be based. Virginia, the
domicile of the defendant, has no interest in preventing contribu-
tion and does have an admonitory interest, albeit a weak one, since
the tortious conduct occurred in Virginia. West Virginia, on the
other hand, has no real interest at all. Since this is not spouse suing
spouse, the case falls outside the purview of the West Virginia doc-
57. R. WEINTmAuB, COMENTARY ON THE CoFLCr OF LAWS 228 (1971).
58. See Va. Sup. Ct. Rule 3:10, Va. Code Ann. (Repl. Vol. 1977).
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trine.5' Here, as in the two previous examples, there is only one
interested state. Virginia law should apply.
All of the above examples have at their heart a false conflict, the
usual by-product of the inter-spousal immunity doctrine in conflict
of laws. Automobile Guest Statute cases are also big generators of
the specious conflict, but in addition, the guest-host relationship
will, on rare occasion, yield the far more troublesome true conflict.
Consider briefly a final false conflict. Two Virginia domiciliaries,
H and G set out on a trip to Philadelphia. The host, H, is driving
through Delaware when, through ordinary negligence on his part, an
accident occurs which injures his guest, G. Delaware, the purely
fortuitous place of the accident will not permit a guest to recover
from his host without a showing of "willful or wanton disregard for
the rights of others.""' The guest, G, brings suit in Virginia. Beyond
a knee-jerk application of lex loci delicti, what rationale is there for
applying Delaware law? Virginia has two real interests in the com-
pensation of an injured Virginia domiciliary: to prevent him from
becoming a public charge and to ensure that there is a pool from
which medical creditors may be compensated. Delaware's stated
policies for its guest statute' are to shield, from an ungrateful guest,
the host who transports another in his automobile without any bene-
fit to himself"2 and, paradoxically, to prevent collusion between
these same parties in a suit where the real defendant is the host's
liability insurer. 3 Delaware may be concerned with insulating Dela-
ware hosts and their insurers from liability, but it has no interest
59. Even if an unarticulated reason for West Virginia's adherence to the doctrine were one
commonly advanced-prevention of collusion between the spouses to defraud the in-
surer-there is no room for advancement of that policy here. Any collusion that might take
place would be to keep the husband's insurer out, not put it in, since this would tend to
increase rates.
60. DEL. CODE tit. 21, § 6101(a)(1974), provides:
No person transported by the owner or operator of a motor vehicle, boat, airplane
or other vehicle as his guest without payment for such transportation shall have a cause
of action for damages against such owner or operator for injury, death or loss, in case
of accident, unless such accident was intentional on the part of such owner or operator
or was caused by his willful or wanton disregard of the rights of others.
61. DEL. CODE tit. 21, § 6101. See note 60 supra.
62. Fields v. Synthetic Ropes, Inc., 219 A.2d 374 (Del. Super. Ct. 1966); Robb v. Ramey
Assoc., Inc., 14 A.2d 394 (Del. Super. Ct. 1940); Truitt v. Gaines, 199 F. Supp. 143 (1961).
63. Justice v. Gatchell, 325 A.2d 97 (Del. 1974); McHugh v. Brown, 50 Del. 154, 125 A.2d
i83 (1956); Truitt v. Gaines, 199 F. Supp. 143 (1961).
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in extending such protection to the world. Application of Virginia
law, on the other hand, advances Virginia's compensation interest
without impinging on any legitimate concern of Delaware, and will
in fact advance Delaware's interest in promoting highway safety
within her borders by imposing a higher standard of care.
Suppose that the parties to the suit are not conveniently domi-
ciled in one state. Suppose, for instance, that a Virginia domiciliary,
who attends the University of Delaware, accepts a ride to class with
a Delaware domiciled friend and is injured through the ordinary
negligence of the Delaware driver. Since we are concerned with Vir-
ginia courts, we will have the Delawarian pass through Virginia
where personal service of process is obtained on him. Our Virginia
court finds a true conflict: Virginia's interest in compensating the
injured Virginian is at loggerheads with Delaware's interest in insu-
lating Delaware hosts and their insurers from liability. Under pure
interest analysis the court would be directed to apply Virginia law,
the law of the forum." The plaintiff would be pleased, but this is
personal law15 carried to an extreme; it encourages forum shopping
and invites retaliation against Virginia defendants. The reason that
the result would be so disconcerting is that the territorial framework
under which the cause arose is wholly in Delaware. Although both
states are interested, Virginia's only nexus with the case is a Vir-
ginia plaintiff. Said in another way, the Delaware defendant has no
contacts with Virginia, and he would rightly be shocked if told that
Virginia law would control on the effect of his host-guest relation-
ship with the plaintiff. This suggests the one limitation that must
be placed on governmental iiterest analysis to make its application
meet the test of substantial justice: a state may not apply its law
on the sole ground that the plaintiff is its domiciliary. In all other
cases involving a true conflict, it will apply the law of the forum.
In the hypothetical case above, the suggested approach would
require application of the Delaware guest statute; 'if the accident
occurred in Virginia, Virginia law would control. This is a great deal
like lex loci delicti, because the territorial framework in most true
conflicts will center at the place of the wrong, but stops short of it
64. See note 41 supra.
65. Couch, Louisiana Adopts Interest Analysis: Applause and Some Observations, 49 TuL.
L. REv. 1, 9 (1974).
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for a good reason. That reason is brought to light by a hypothetical
loosely based on the Kentucky case of Foster v. Leggett.6"
Our case has a Delaware domiciled industrialist who manufac-
tures goods in Virginia. Like Leggett, our Delawarian spends all of
his working hours and some of his leisure time in Virginia, where he
rents an apartment. He invites a Virginia domiciled friend for a
weekend visit at his Delaware home. They fly up in the Delawarian's
plane, and, due to ordinary negligence on the part of the industrial-
ist, the plane crash lands, injuring the Virginian. It is clear that the
Virginian has no relationship with Delaware, but the industrialist,
while domiciled in that state, also has a real and substantial rela-
tionship with Virginia. Application of Virginia law on these facts
cannot surprise the defendant and accords well with the territorial
configuration under which the cause arose.
V. CONCLUSION
The suggested methodology, governmental interest analysis tem-
pered by territorialism, lays no claim to perfection. A commentator,
writing in a vacuum, has an advantage over a court. A commentator
can choose the situations he wishes to explore; a court must decide
issues on the facts presented. At the very least it will permit avoid-
ance of the occasional grotesqueries spawned by blind application
of lex loci delicti, while retaining enough definition to yield deci-
sions with precedential value. Lex loci delicti grew up in a horse and
buggy age; if the just and final solution to choice of law problems
in tort is farther down the road, a modem approach, whether this
one or another, is the better vehicle to take to that goal.
Thomas J. Cavuto
66. 484 S.W.2d 827 (Ky. 1972). The case concerned a conflict between Ohio having a guest
statute and Kentucky, which did not. The defendant was domiciled in Ohio where he had a
house, but he worked in Kentucky, rented a room there and spent two to five nights a week
there. The defendant had been dating plaintiff's decedent, a Kentficky domiciliary. The
couple made plans to spend a day in Ohio. While travelling in Ohio, the accident occurred.
While the defendant was an Ohioan, he could also be described as a Kentuckian. The fatal
trip had been planned in Kentucky, began there and would have ended there. Kentucky law
was applied.
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